Logic Matters

I put some quick notes together for myself for the Hodges reading group yesterday: I’ll work away at them again in the next few days (and certainly before the next seminar), and post the resulting after-the-event handout here, for it’s worth [Later, this might take longer than I wanted]. I must say that the Hodges book is turning out to be harder going than I had imagined: he is capable elsewhere of writing about difficult stuff with verve and great clarity, but here things get a lot denser. I thought it might just be that my pure maths (group theory and the like) is rusty enough for me not to be getting enough out of some of the examples he gives: but then some mathmos have expressed similar views about his approachability.

A very noticeable difference in style is emerging between a logic reading group run for philosophers and one with a mixed group of philosophers, mathmos and compscis. Philosophers — ok, our friendly local lot — seem to be happy to share their ignorance, and take turns week-by-week to introduce a chapter or a paper, albeit fairly briefly, even if they make no pretence to really be on top of the stuff. And they will dive into the discussion, cheerfully asking for clarification, or trying out toy mini-examples, etc. Mathmos and compscis on the other hand — although personally a perfectly friendly bunch! — seem on the whole very reluctant to volunteer to have a bash at introducing a chapter, or indeed to say anything much after someone has given the intro. Which is a pity, as I learn a lot from the exchanges when they do happen.

Thursday’s Routledge Lecture here was given by Andy Clark. I thought he did a terrific job for a lecture intended for an audience not just of philosophers. I don’t know if he is right or indeed if I fully understand what his position about the messiness of the mind comes to (and for once “I’m not sure I understand …” is not philosopher-speak for “I’m damned sure he is horribly confused …”). But I certainly think that he is concerned with a bunch of interesting issues, the kind of thing that is actually worth working on in the philosophy of mind — engaging hands-on with the sciences of the mind.

I always thought of my old intro book with Owen Jones, The Philosophy of Mind, as an exercise in getting out of the way the relatively uninteresting a priori arm-chair stuff, kicking into touch various bits of mystery-mongering, leaving the field clear to get on with the interesting stuff engaging with work in cognitive neuro-psychology, artificial intelligence and the like. To be sure, we no doubt didn’t get the a priori story dead right. But who really cares? We only need to get it, so to speak, right enough to enable us stop worrying that there might be mysterious obstacles in the way to a many-pronged empirically-informed assault on the interesting stuff. When I dip into the journals is a bit depressing to find in some areas epicycles of armchair reflection still being piled up by philosophers of mind. So three cheers for the likes of Andy Clark who remind us that it doesn’t have to be that way.