More Gödel, less Parsons, no LaTeX

The first nine episodes of the revised Gödel Without (Too Many) Tears are now online here. (Two more to come next week, and a closing review in a twelfth episode thereafter.)

But my plan to work through Parsons again here has unfortunately had to be shelved as a result of other New Zealand excitements. Though I do still hope to have something more useful to say about Parsons’s claims about induction and impredicativity in particular.

And, prompted by a couple of emails, I’m vividly aware that I’ve promised for ages to seriously update LaTeX for Logicians and move it to a new home here. I will get round to that when I get back to the UK in April.

1 thought on “More Gödel, less Parsons, no LaTeX”

  1. Just came across your earlier remarks on Rosser’s proof, and was directed here.

    Doesn’t Rosser’s proof—unlike Goedel’s—presume that Aristotle’s Particularisation holds over the natural numbers?

    An instance of AP: If the formula [~(Ax)~R(x)] is provable in S, and [R(x)] interprets as the predicate R*(x) under an interpretation I of S over a well-defined domain D, then we may always conclude that there is some s in D such that R*(s) holds in D if I is a sound interpretation of S over D.

    Moreover, isn’t PA omega-consistent if, and only if, AP holds under any sound interpretation of PA over the natural number domain?

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