## Logical notes and papers

### Some logical blog pieces

- Philosophy of maths: a reading list
- Does mathematics need a philosophy?
- Philosophical logic: five books from the back catalogue
- On Frege seeing what is in front of his nose.
- Begriffsschrift and absolutely unrestricted quantification
- What Frege didn’t tell you
- Tarski on Truth, a thumbnail sketch
- Partial functions and free logic
- Revisiting an old result of Hintikka’s
- A query about countability
- Negative type theory
- [More to be added]

### A few papers and handouts

These old pieces written round about the time I retired are of very varying levels of sophistication, difficulty and interest: but I haven’t tried to impose any more order on the list other than a rough (reverse) chronological order.

- Notes on ‘the contemporary conception of logic’ gives evidence against a claim by Goldfarb (endorsed by some others) about the supposedly dominant conception of logic as dealing in schemata. (2013)
- Tennenbaum’s Theorem (a rewritten version of a reasonably accessible proof, with the old short discussion of its sometimes supposed conceptual significance which fed into the joint paper with Tim Button). 2013, revised 2014.
- Is ‘no’ a force-indicator? Sometimes, possibly (with Luca Incurvati)
*Analysis*2012. - The philosophical significance of Tennenbaum’s Theorem (with Tim Button)
*Philosophia Mathematica*2011 - Squeezing arguments (on Kreisel’s argument — what it does and doesn’t show: expanding a bit on part of the Squeezing Church’s Thesis talk). Draft of paper in
*Analysis*2011. - The MRDP Theorem (introduction to what it says and why it matters)
- Cuts, consistency and axiomatized theories (A short and naive introduction to the chapter in Negri and von Plato’s
*Structural Proof Theory*on cut-elimination for certain kinds of theories — though you don’t have to have read the book to follow the story.) - On chs 5 & 6 of Mary Leng’s
*Mathematics and Reality*(concerning naturalism about mathematics). - The Galois connection between syntax and semantics (explains Lawvere’s remark about ‘the familiar Galois connection between sets of axioms and classes of models, for a fixed [signature]’).
- Field on truth: how complex is
*too*complex? (worries sceptically about the conceptual significance of Field’s intricate constructions). - Curry’s paradox, Lukasiewicz and Field (some cheerfully naive notes introducing Ch. 4 of Field’s Saving
*Truth from Paradox*, for a reading group). - Kleene’s Normal Form Theorem entails Gödel’s Incomplete Theorem (explained in just two pages).
- Squeezing Church’s Thesis again (a talk given a few times in New Zealand, explaining what I was up to at the end of my Gödel book, but a little better!)
- Induction and predicativity (another talk given in New Zealand, for a non-expert audience).
- Entailment, with nods to Lewy and Smiley (an introductory talk to a seminar, something of an exercise in Cambridge piety: the promised next talk on Tennant wasn’t given though for reasons I can’t recall!).
- Rejection and valuations (with Luca Incurvati, draft of
*Analysis*paper published in Jan 2010). - Wittgenstein on mathematics and games (discussing §108 of the
*Big Typescript*). - There are sea-serpents, Jim, but not as we know them (talk given to a metaphysics group in Cambridge, commenting on Zoltan Szabo’s “Believing in things”).
- Ancestral arithmetic and Isaacson’s thesis (stand-alone paper published in
*Analysis*, reworking ideas in my Gödel book). - Induction, more or less (expanded version of talk given at Dan Isaacson’s seminar in Oxford in 2007, mostly on ACA
_{0}).